Introduction
The concept of set-approachability, as introduced in Blackwell [7] , concerns a repeated matrix game with vector-valued payoffs that is played by two players, the agent and the opponent. Thus, for each pair of simultaneous actions a and z in the one-stage game, a payoff vector r(a, z) ∈ R ℓ is obtained. Given a target set S in R ℓ , the agent's goal is to have the long-term average reward vector approach S, namely converge to S almost surely in the point-to-set distance. If that convergence can be ensured irrespectively of the opponent's strategy, the set S is said to be approachable, and a strategy of the agent that satisfies this property is an approaching strategy (or algorithm) for S.
Approachability has close connections with online learning algorithms, and in particular with the notion of no-regret strategies. In fact, soon after no-regret strategies for repeated games were introduced in Hannan [15] , it was shown by Blackwell [6] that the problem can be formulated and solved as a particular case of the general approachability problem, for a suitably defined set and payoff vector. An extensive overview of these concepts and their inter-relations can be found in Fudenberg and Levine [14] , Young [41] , and Cesa-Bianchi and Lugosi [9] .
By its very definition, the notion of an approachable set accommodates a worst-case scenario, as the target set must be approached for any strategy of the opponent. However, as the game unfolds, it may turn out that the temporal variability in the sequence of the opponent's actions is limited in some sense. For example, the opponent may choose to employ a stationary strategy, namely repeat a single mixed action, or perhaps repeat a certain sequence of actions. If these restrictions were known in advance, the agent could possibly ensure convergence to a target set S that is not approachable in general, or perhaps converge to a subset of the target set S that is deemed more desirable. Our goal here is to formulate opportunistic approachability algorithms, in the sense that they may exploit such limitations on the opponent's action sequence in an online manner, without knowing them beforehand.
To illustrate the ideas involved, it will be useful to consider here some examples.
Example 1. Consider a scalar reward matrix given by r(0, 0) = 2, r(1, 1) = −2, and r(0, 1) = r(1, 0) = 0, where A = Z = {0, 1} are the actions available to the agent and the opponent. Suppose the agent's goal is to have its long-term average reward larger or equal to 1 in absolute value, namely |R n | ≥ 1 − o(1), whereR n = 1 n n k=1 r(a k , z k ). This clearly corresponds to an approachability problem, with the non-convex target set S = (−∞, −1] ∪ [1, ∞). Now, it is easily seen that for any mixed action q = (q(0), q(1)) of the opponent, the agent has a response p = (p(0), p(1)) so that r(p, q) a,z p(a)q(z)r(a, z) ∈ S. Thus, if the opponent is restricted a-priori to stationary strategies, the agent can easily devise a (possibly adaptive) strategy that approaches S. However, this is clearly not the case in general: for example, the opponent can ensureR n → 0 by playing z n = 0 wheneverR n−1 < 0, and z n = 1 otherwise. We see that the agent cannot approach the required target set S in general, but can hope to do so if the opponent happens to play a stationary strategy.
Example 1 satisfies the following property: For every mixed action q of the opponent, there exists a mixed action p of the agent so that r(p, q) ∈ S. This condition, referred to as Blackwell's dual condition, will play a central role in the following. As shown by Blackwell [7] , for a convex set S this condition is necessary and sufficient for S to be approachable; however, for non-convex sets this condition is only necessary but not sufficient, as seen above.
The next example demonstrates how non-convex target sets that satisfy Blackwell's dual condition can arise naturally in the context of no-regret algorithms.
Example 2. Suppose the agent wishes to maximize a scalar average rewardR n , defined as before, subject to a long-term average cost constraint of the formC n ≤ γ + o(1), whereC n is the n-step average of a (scalar or vector-valued) cost function c(a, z). Let r estimate the opponent's mixed action online and choose an appropriate response to the current estimate at each stage). However, against an arbitrary opponent only the convex hull of S is approachable in general. Our goal is to devise opportunistic approachability algorithms that, in addition to approaching this convex hull, seek to approach strict subsets thereof when the opponent's play turns out to be restricted in an appropriate sense. In particular, in the extreme case that the opponent plays a stationary strategy, we require that the set S itself be approached.
In fact, the algorithms we devise are shown to converge to a single point in S when the opponent is stationary. Moreover, we establish this convergence (and generalizations thereof) under the broader property of empirical stationarity, which is defined only in terms of the observed pure actions of the opponent.
The central contributions of this paper are the following:
• We formulate an appropriate concept of opportunistic approachability, which relies on an accompanying notions of statistically and empirically restricted opponent.
• We propose a class of approachability algorithms that is based on a calibrated forecast of the opponent's actions [10, 13] . In contrast to the standard approachability algorithms that are based on Blackwell's primal condition, our algorithms are based on Blackwell's dual condition. Hence, they do not require the computation of the projection to the target set S, or the computation of the convex hull of S whenever S is non-convex. Instead, they require only a computation of a best-response at a finite number of points. We note, however, that the computational complexity is transferred in some sense to that of the calibrated forecasts.
• We show that the calibration-based algorithms are opportunistic in the above mentioned sense when facing a statistically restricted opponent. Moreover, to establish the opportunistic properties against an empirically restricted opponent, we require the calibrated forecast to be slowly timevarying in an appropriate sense, which we establish for a specific forecasting algorithm.
• We apply our opportunistic approachability framework to the constrained regret minimization problem introduced in Example 2. Our algorithms attain the convex relaxation of the constrained best-reward-in-hindsight, while satisfying the long-term constrains. In addition, in the fortuitous event that the opponent's play is empirically or statistically restricted, our algorithms attain the constrained best-reward-in-hindsight itself.
Since Blackwell's original construction, several approachability algorithms and related results have been proposed in the literature. Hart and Mas-Colell [16] proposed a class of approachability algorithms, by using a general directional mapping instead of the one based on Euclidean distance to the target set. Shimkin and Shwartz [37] and Milman [33] extended the basic approachability concept and results to stochastic games. Hou [18] and Spinat [39] , independently, formulated a necessary and sufficient condition for approachability of general (not necessarily convex) sets. In Lehrer [20] , approachability theory was extended to infinite dimensional spaces. Lehrer and Solan [22] give the characterization of the family of approachable sets when the player is restricted to use strategies with bounded memory. Abernethy et al. [1] established an equivalence between no-regret learning and the approachability problem. Mannor et al. [25] proposed a robust approachability algorithm for repeated games with partial monitoring and applied it to the corresponding regret minimization problem. Moreover, Perchet and Quincampoix [35] proposed a unified framework for approachability both in full or partial monitoring case. The approachability policies discussed in all these papers are based on Blackwell's primal condition, which is a geometric separation condition with respect to the fixed target set. Therefore, the existing algorithms are not opportunistic in the sense we advocate in this paper.
The idea of approachability using a response function appears in Lehrer and Solan [21] in the context of internal no-regret strategies (see Lehrer and Solan [23] for the updated version of that paper), and in Bernstein and Shimkin [5] in the context of approachability without projection. It also resembles the ideas in recent papers such as Mannor et al. [25] and Perchet and Quincampoix [35] . However, opportunistic properties of the related algorithms are not analyzed in these works. A recent work by Bubeck and Slivkins [8] considered the multi-armed bandit problem, and proposed an algorithm that simultaneously achieves the optimal convergence rates against both arbitrary and stationary opponents. However, the opportunistic property there is with respect to the convergence rates rather than with respect to the achievable goal.
The idea of choosing a best-response to calibrated forecasts was first introduced in Foster and Vohra [13] in the context of attaining correlated equilibrium, and was subsequently used in Mannor and Shimkin [28] and Mannor et al. [30] in the context of regret minimization. An approachability strategy that is based on calibrated forecasts was apparently proposed by Perchet [34] ; however, the discussion there is limited only to convex sets, and hence the opportunistic properties of the algorithm are not analyzed.
We note that the calibration-based algorithm, while conceptually simple, is computationally challenging due to the computational complexity of obtaining calibrated forecasts. In particular, given the recent result of Hazan and Kakade [17] , it is unlikely that there exists an efficient algorithm to compute an exact calibrated forecast when the number of actions available to the opponent is large. The only computationally efficient calibration algorithms known in the literature are for the case of binary sequences [26] . Thus, our calibration-based scheme is computationally efficient in this case. For opponents with non-binary action sets, other methods need be considered. It should be emphasized that the main goal in this paper is in formulating the concept of opportunistic approachability and in showing that there exist algorithms that fit this concept. Hence, the computational issues are left for future work. Finally, we note that the convergence rates of our algorithms are that of the calibrated forecast used. E.g., for ǫ-calibration (and thus, ǫ-approachability) using internal regret minimization, the rate is the standard rate of convergence of no-regret algorithms, that is of O(1/ √ n). The paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, we review the approachability problem and standard approachability algorithms. In Section 3, we introduce the concept of opportunistic approachability along with the definitions of the response and goal functions, which will be used subsequently in our algorithms. Section 4 provides a background on calibrated forecasts, presents the calibration-based approachability algorithm, and analyzes its performance in the cases of a general and statistically restricted opponent. In Section 5, we introduce slowly varying calibrated forecasts, establish their existence, and analyze the performance of our algorithms in the case of empirically restricted opponent. Section 6 applies the proposed algorithms to the problem of constrained regret minimization. We conclude in Section 7 with some final remarks.
Review of the Approachability Problem
In this Section, we present the approachability problem and review the basic conditions for a set to be approachable, as well as Blackwell's approachability algorithm.
Consider a repeated two-person game between an agent and an arbitrary opponent (that collectively represents that agent's environment, including the effect of Nature as well as that of other agents active there). The agent chooses its actions from a finite set A, while the opponent chooses its actions from a finite set Z. At each time instance n = 1, 2, ..., the agent selects its action a n ∈ A, observes the action z n ∈ Z chosen by the opponent, and obtains a vector reward r n = r(a n , z n ) ∈ R ℓ , ℓ ≥ 1, where r : A × Z → R ℓ is a given function. The average reward vector obtained by the agent up to time n is thenR n = n −1 n k=1 r k . A mixed action of the agent is the probability distribution p ∈ ∆(A), where p(a) specifies the probability of choosing action a ∈ A. Similarly, q ∈ ∆(Z) denotes a mixed action of the opponent. Letq n ∈ ∆(Z) denote the empirical distribution of the opponent's actions at time n, withq
Also, define the span of the reward vector
where · is Euclidean norm.
In what follows, we will slightly abuse notation and let
denote the expected reward under mixed actions p ∈ ∆(A) and q ∈ ∆(Z); the distinction between r(a, z) and r(p, q) should be clear by their arguments. Occasionally, we will use r(p, z) = a∈A p(a)r(a, z) for the expected reward under mixed action p ∈ ∆(A) and pure action z ∈ Z. The notation r(a, q) is interpreted similarly.
Let
denote the history of the game up to time n. A strategy π = (π n ) of the agent is a collection of the decision rules π n : (A × Z) n−1 → ∆(A), n ≥ 1, where each mapping π n specifies the mixed action for the agent at time n, based on the observed history:
The pure action a n taken by the agent is then selected randomly according to p n . Similarly, the opponent's strategy is denoted by σ = (σ n ), with σ n : (A × Z) n−1 → ∆(Z). Let P π,σ denote the probability measure on (A × Z) ∞ induced by the strategy pair (π, σ). In what follows, all the probabilistic statements are assumed to hold with respect to these measures.
In the approachability problem, we consider a set S ⊆ R ℓ , and ask if there exists a strategy for the agent that will bring the average reward vector to S (asymptotically, almost surely) no matter what the opponent's strategy is. Below is the classical definition of an approachable set from Blackwell [7] .
Definition 1 (Approachable Set). A closed set S ⊆ R ℓ is approachable by the agent's strategy π if the average rewardR n = n −1 n k=1 r k converges to S almost surely for every strategy σ of the opponent 1 . The set S is approachable if there exists such a strategy for the agent. In what follows, we find it convenient to state all our results in terms of the expected average reward, where the expected value is only with respect to the agent's mixed actions:
With this modified reward, the stated convergence results will be shown to hold pathwise, for any possible sequence of the opponent's actions. The corresponding almost sure results for the actual average reward can be easily deduced, using martingale convergence theory. Indeed, note that
1 Blackwell's original definition requires almost sure convergence at a uniform rate over the probability distributions induced by the strategies π and σ. Our algorithms satisfy this definition provided that the convergence of the employed calibrated forecasts is uniform, as for example in the case of the calibration forecaster discussed in Section 5.2 in this paper. However, we will not assume it here. Now, the first term is the norm of the mean of the martingale difference sequence D k = r(a k , z k ) − r(p k , z k ) and can readily be shown to converge to zero at a uniform rate of O (1/ √ n); see, e.g., Shiryaev [38] or Cesa-Bianchi and Lugosi [9] .
Next, we present a formulation of Blackwell's Theorem [7] which provides us with a sufficient condition for approachability of a general set S. To this end, for any x / ∈ S, let c(x) ∈ S denote a closest point in S to x. Also, for any p ∈ ∆(A) let T (p) {r(p, q) : q ∈ ∆(Z)}, which equals the convex hull of the points {r(p, z)} z∈Z .
Definition 2 (Primal Condition: B-Sets). A closed set S ⊆ R ℓ is called a B-set (where B stands for Blackwell) if for every x / ∈ S there exists a mixed action p = p(x) ∈ ∆(A) such that the hyperplane through y = c(x) perpendicular to the line segment xy, separates x from T (p).
Theorem 1 (Sufficient Condition and Algorithm). Every B-set is approachable, by using at time n the mixed action p(r n−1 ) of Definition 2 wheneverr n−1 / ∈ S. (Ifr n−1 ∈ S, an arbitrary action can be used.) Remark 1. Theorem 1 holds also ifr n is replaced withR n . In addition, a dual necessary condition for approachability can be formulated as follows.
Theorem 2 (Necessary Condition). A closed set S is approachable only if it is a D-set.
For convex target sets, Blackwell [7] showed that the primal and dual conditions coincide.
Theorem 3. Let S be a closed convex set. Then, the following statements are equivalent: (i) S is approachable, (ii) S is a B-set, and (iii) S is a D-set.
Theorem 3 has the following Corollary. Corollary 1. The convex hull of a D-set is approachable (and is also a B-set).
Proof. The convex hull of a D-set is a convex D-set. The claim then follows by Theorem 3. We note that a complete characterization of the family of approachable sets was provided independently by Hou [18] and Spinat [39] . They proved that a closed set S is approachable if and only if it contains a B-set. However, this result is not used in the present paper, as our main interest here is in the dual (rather than primal) condition. Hence, throughout the paper, we assume that the target set S satisfies the following condition.
Observe that we do not assume that S is a convex set. Consequently, while conv(S) is approachable by Corollary 1, S itself need not be approachable.
Our focus in this paper is on conceptually simple approachability strategy that is based on the dual condition, previously proposed by Perchet [34] : at each time n use the mixed action p n ∈ ∆(A) which is a response (in the sense of Definition 3) to a calibrated forecast y n ∈ ∆(Z) of the pure action z n ∈ Z. The definition of calibrated forecasts and the analysis of this strategy is presented in Section 4.
We note that in parts of this paper, the set S will only be implicitly defined through an appropriate response function, so that Assumption 1 is satisfied by definition of the latter; see Remark 2 in Section 3.
Opportunistic Approachability
In this Section, we define the desiderata for an opportunistic approachability algorithm. To that end, we first define appropriate notions of a statistically and an empirically restricted play of the opponent, as well as the response and goal function for the given target set.
Before making formal definitions, we state the idea of our approach. We propose algorithms that simultaneously achieve the following goals, for any D-set S:
1. The convex hull of S is approached, for any strategy of the opponent. 2. If the mixed actions of the opponent or, more generally, the empirical frequencies of the opponent's actions are restricted to a subset of its mixed actions space (in the sense of Definitions 4 and 5 below), then the algorithm approaches a corresponding strict subset of conv(S). In particular, if the opponent is stationary, the set S itself is approached.
Restricted Opponent Play
We start with a definition of restricted play of the opponent in terms of the sequence of its mixed actions {q n }, which is intuitive and easy to state. In particular, we consider the notion of a statistically restricted play, in the sense that {q n } is asymptotically restricted to some set Q ⊆ ∆(Z). We note that this and other definitions below relate to a given sample path of the process (rather than to the overall policy of the opponent).
Definition 4 (Statistically Q-Restricted Play). We say that the play of the opponent is statistically Q-restricted , if there exists a convex subset Q ⊆ ∆(Z) so that the sequence {q n } of the mixed actions of the opponent satisfies, for the given sample path,
Here, d(q, Q) is Euclidean point-to-set distance. Observe that the Cesaro mean convergence of Definition 4 is a weaker assumption than the convergence of d(q n , Q) to zero.
A possible weakness of Definition 4 is that the mixed actions of the opponent are not generally revealed (when its strategy is not known), or may even lack an explicit meaning (e.g., when the opponent is Nature). We therefore proceed to define a notion of an empirically restricted play of the opponent, in terms of the empirical frequencies of the opponent's pure actions. To this end, we need to refer to a certain partition of the time axis into blocks on which these frequencies are computed. We let τ m denote the length of block m = 1, 2, .... Also, we let n M = M m=1 τ m denote the time at the end of block M . Finally,q m ∈ ∆(Z) denotes the empirical distribution of the opponent's actions of block m, namelyq
With this in hand, we introduce the following.
Definition 5 (Empirically Q-Restricted Play). We say that the play of the opponent is empirically Q-restricted with respect to a partition {τ m }, if there exists a convex subset Q ⊆ ∆(Z) so that, for the given sample path,
We note that the requirement of Definition 5 is much weaker than that of Definition 4 (as Lemma 2 below shows), and hence be our focus. To see this, consider the following simple example.
Mathematics of Operations Research 00(0), pp. 000-000, c 0000 INFORMS Example 3. Consider binary sequences of actions, and let Q = {(0.5, 0.5)}, a singleton. The deterministic sequence 0101... is empirically Q-restricted with respect to any partition with fixed even block lengths, or with any strictly increasing blocks lengths. However, the opponent that generates this sequence using alternating mixed actions (1, 0), (0, 1) is of course not statistically Q-restricted.
Observe that our definition of empirically Q-restricted play involves a general partition {τ m } rather than a partition with fixed lengths τ m ≡ τ . The main reason behind this general definition is the fact that we would like to cover the case of statistically stationary sequences. The following example clarifies this point.
Example 4. Consider a stationary opponent that chooses its actions using a fixed strictlymixed action q 0 ∈ ∆(Z), and the corresponding restriction set Q = {q 0 }. In this case, the sequence of pure actions will not satisfy Definition 5 with probability one if we choose a partition with fixed (or bounded) block lengths. Actually, we can satisfy Definition 5 with probability one only if we choose a partition with super-logarithmically increasing lengths (as is shown in general by Lemma 2 below).
A given sequence of actions may satisfy Definition 5 under different partitions, as the following example demonstrates.
Example 5. Recall the setting of Example 3, and consider the sequence 01001100001111.... The empirical frequencies of this sequence do not converge to Q, but it is empirically Q-restricted with respect to a partition with exponentially increasing lengths τ m = 2
m . However, if we choose any partition with sub-exponentially increasing lengths, Definition 5 will not be satisfied.
In general, we are interested in the minimum possible block lengths that will ensure that Definition 5 is satisfied. Moreover, we mostly focus on the sequences for which Definition 5 can be satisfied with a partition with sub-exponentially increasing block lengths. This is motivated by the following lemma, which shows that Definition 5 requires more than just convergence ofq n to Q. Lemma 1. If Definition 5 is satisfied with respect to a partition with sub-exponentially increasing block lengths for some Q ⊆ ∆(Z), thenq n converges to Q. However, the converse is not true. Namely, there exist a sequence of actions so thatq n converges to Q, but there is no partition with sub-exponentially increasing block lengths so that Definition 5 is satisfied with respect to it.
Proof. For any n
where the second inequality holds by the convexity of the point-to-set Euclidean distance to a convex set, and by the fact that the changes inq n are of the order of 1/n. But, if τ m increases sub-exponentially, we have that τ M /n M−1 → 0, and the result follows. To see why the converse need not be true, consider the sequence 01001100001111... from Example 5. It can be easily verified thatq n (1) → Q = [1/3, 1/2] in this case. However, if we choose any partition with sub-exponentially increasing lengths, we have that, in the long-term,q m (1) is either close 0 or to 1, so that lim inf
It should be emphasized that the convergence ofq n to a restriction set Q seems to be not sufficient to guarantee opportunistic convergence of the average reward in terms of Q. In particular, the convergence of the empirical frequenciesq n does not say anything about the rate of this convergence. Indeed, consider again the sequence 01001100001111... from Example 5. As noted in the proof of Lemma 1,q n converges to a strict subset of [0, 1]. However, if we choose any partition with subexponentially increasing lengths, we have that, in the long-term, the empirical frequency of 1 at any interval is either close 0 or to 1, implying that opportunistic convergence is impossible.
Finally, we claim that, almost surely, the requirement in Definition 4 implies the requirement in Definition 5 (see Appendix A for a proof).
Lemma 2. Suppose that the play of the opponent is statistically Q-restricted in the sense of Definition 4, almost surely, with respect to the probability distribution induced by the strategies of the agent and the opponent. Then the requirement of Definition 5 is satisfied with respect to any partition {τ m } with super-logarithmically increasing block lengths.
Response and Goal Functions
By definition of a D-set, one can define a response function p * that for any q returns p such that r(p, q) ∈ S. Below we demonstrate that p * cannot be continuous in general. We therefore settle for the following piecewise continuity property. Similarly, a q ∈ [0, 1] is identified with a mixed action (q, 1 − q) of the opponent. Observe that for q < 0.5 and p ≤ 0.5 − q, we have that r(p, q) ≤ −1 and therefore r(p, q) ∈ S. Similarly, for q > 0.5 and p ≥ 1.5 − q, we have that r(p, q) ≥ 1, implying that r(p, q) ∈ S. We thus can define a regular response function as follows:
While other selections for p * (q) can be made, all of them will have a discontinuity at q = 0.5.
Below we show that we can always choose a regular (that is, piecewise-continuous) response function. Proof. To prove this Lemma, we use standard results from set-valued analysis (see for instance Aubin and Frankowska 2). We construct a set-valued function f (q) as follows:
Since S is closed and r(p, q) is continuous, it follows that for every {q n } and q such that q n → q, we have that lim n→∞ f (q n ) ⊆ f (q), in the sense that if p n ∈ f (q n ) is such that p n → p then p ∈ f (q). We conclude that f is an upper semi-continuous set-valued function. It follows from Fort's Theorem that f is also lower semi-continuous on a residual subset of S, namely on a set whose complement is a meager set. In our case, this is an open set whose complement has measure 0. Pick a finite partition of ∆(Z). Now, from Michael's Selection Theorem [32] , we know that on every element of the partition we have a continuous selection. Thus, we can choose p * (q) ∈ f (q) such that p * is a piecewise continuous function. The actual choice of p * is problem dependent. In Section 6 we will see an example where p * is naturally defined as a best-response map. In general, we make the following assumption.
Assumption 2. Let p * be a regular response function relative to the given target set S, which we fix in the following. We assume that p * (q) can be efficiently computed for any given q ∈ ∆(Z).
We note that Assumption 2 implies Assumption 1 by the definition of p * . Hence, throughout, we suppose that Assumption 2 holds, and we usually do not refer to the target set S explicitly.
Remark 2. Observe that a given response function p * induces the following set:
This is the minimal target set for which p * is a (regular) response function. Consequently, we can start from a given response function p * that will define the target set S(p * ). Moreover, the definition of the response function implies that any set S that contains S(p * ) can be considered as a feasible target set.
The specified response function p * leads naturally to our next definition. Definition 7 (Goal Function). The goal function r * : ∆(Z) → S is defined as r * (q) = r (p * (q) , q) for any q ∈ ∆(Z).
Opportunistic Strategies
When the play of the opponent turns out to be statistically/empirically Q-restricted, we will essentially require the average reward to converge to R(Q) = conv{r * (q) : q ∈ Q}, the convex hull of the image of Q under the goal function r * (see Figure 1 ). Due to possible discontinuities in r * , we need to slightly expand that definition. Definition 8 (Closed Convex Image). The closed convex image of a set Q ⊆ ∆(Z) under the goal function r * is defined as
In words, the set R + (Q) contains the convex hull of all the points of r * (q), q ∈ Q, together with possible jumps in r * on the boundary of Q. Note that R + (Q) ⊂ conv(S), as r * (q) ∈ S by its definition. We illustrate the inclusion of jumps using the following example.
Example 7 (Example 6 continued). Consider the response function defined in (2) . The corresponding goal function is given by r * (q) = −2(1 − q), for q ≤ 0.5 2q, otherwise.
We now compute the closed convex image of singeltons:
Observe that the discontinuity of r * at q = 0.5 is expressed by the fact that
With the above notions at hand, we can finally define opportunistic approachability strategies. Definition 9 (Statistically Opportunistic Approachability). A strategy π is statistically opportunistic for a given goal function r * if it holds that
whenever the play of the opponent is statistically Q-restricted (Definition 4) for some set Q ⊆ ∆(Z).
Definition 10 (Empirically Opportunistic Approachability).
A strategy π is empirically opportunistic for a given goal function r * w.r.t. a partition {τ m } if
whenever the play of the opponent is empirically Q-restricted w.r.t. {τ m } (Definition 5) for some set Q ⊆ ∆(Z). It should be emphasized that the definitions of opportunistic approachability strategies are based on the sample path properties of the opponent's play (either in pure or mixed actions). Also, observe that identifying whether the opponent is statistically restricted, or identifying the partition on which the opponent is empirically restricted are not straightforward tasks. However, no such tests are required in order to implement the suggested strategy, nor for its stated opportunistic properties to hold. Moreover, the related convergence results are required to hold without knowing the restriction set Q beforehand.
Remark 3. Note that Definitions 9 and 10 imply the standard definition of approachability, by setting Q = ∆(Z). In this case, R + (Q) ⊆ conv(S), and
Remark 4. Observe that if a strategy is empirically opportunistic with respect to some partition with super-logarithmically increasing lengths, it is also statistically opportunistic (as follows from Lemma 2). But the converse is not necessarily true.
We close this section with a simple example showing that a naive strategy that plays p n = p * (q n−1 ) fails to provide approachability guarantees, even in the case of a convex target set. and target set S = [0.5, ∞). Clearly, S is a convex set, and it is also a D-set: the response function can be taken the same as in (2) and the corresponding goal function is given by r * (q) = 1 − q, for q ≤ 0.5 q, otherwise. Now, assume that the sequence of opponent's actions is a periodic sequence 010101..., and that the naive strategy p n = p * (q n−1 ) is employed by the agent. Since for all even n,q n−1 > 0.5, we have that a n = 0. Also, for odd n,q n−1 = 0.5, and a n = 1. Consequently,R n → 0 / ∈ S. This example illustrates the well-known phenomenon of simple "best-response" strategies: since they choose actions deterministically, they can be "tricked" by the opponent all the time. This is also the case, for example, in the standard no-regret problem where best-response strategies that do not randomize fail to minimize the regret.
Calibration-Based Approachability
In this Section, we present the basic calibrationbased algorithm that is the subject of this paper. We first provide some background on calibrated forecasts, present and analyze our calibration-based approachability algorithm, and prove its properties in the case of a statistically restricted opponent.
Calibrated Forecasts
A forecaster is an algorithm which specifies at each time instance n a probabilistic forecast y n ∈ ∆(Z) of the opponent's action z n , based on the history of observed actions and previous forecasts. The forecaster's policy may be randomized, i.e. at each time n it specifies a probability measure η n over ∆(Z). In this case, the forecast y n ∈ ∆(Z) is drawn at random according to η n .
The following is a standard definition of a calibrated forecaster (see, e.g., Foster and Vohra [13] ).
Definition 11 (Calibrated Forecaster).
A forecaster is calibrated if for every Borel measurable set Q ⊆ ∆(Z) and every strategy of the opponent, it holds that
where 1(z) is the probability vector in ∆(Z) concentrated on z. No deterministic forecaster can be calibrated for all possible sequences of outcomes [10] . However, if the forecaster is allowed to randomize, calibration is possible. Several randomized calibrated forecasters were proposed in the literature (see the overview in [9] , as well as [26] and [12] ). The common approach is to use a finite ǫ-grid over ∆(Z) which is gradually refined in order to fulfil the requirement of Definition 11. To achieve ǫ-calibration, the algorithms usually process the entire grid for each prediction. The only computationally efficient algorithms known in the literature are for the case of binary sequences [26] . Moreover, it was recently shown in [17] that the existence of a general computationally efficient calibrated forecaster would imply the existence of an efficient algorithm for computing approximate Nash equilibria, thus implying the unlikely conclusion that every problem in PPAD (the class of problems that are polynomial time reducible to the problem of computing Nash equilibrium in a two player game) is solvable in polynomial time.
The calibration property in (3) can be interpreted as a merging or averaging property of the forecast relative to the pure actions of the opponent. The next lemma shows that a similar property holds with respect to the mixed (rather than pure) actions. I {y k ∈ Q} (q k − y k ) = 0, a.s.
Proof. The result follows by the strong law of large numbers, applied to the Martingale difference sequence D k = I {y k ∈ Q} (1(z k ) − q k ); see, e.g., Kalai et al. [19] .
It will be convenient to reformulate the calibration property in Lemma 4 in terms of
the joint empirical distribution of the opponent's mixed actions {q k } n k=1 and forecasts {y k } n k=1 by time n. Specifically, let
denote the set of joint probability measures of the opponent's mixed actions (q) and forecasts (y) that satisfy the calibration property. We note that in this and subsequent definitions, we only refer to Borel-measurable sets Q. Then, the statement of Lemma 4 is equivalent to the statement that µ n "converges" to M in the sense that
We next provide an important equivalent characterization of the set M, and also prove variability ordering property (see, e.g., Whitt [40] ) of the marginal distributions of µ ∈ M, that will be used in the sequel. For a given µ ∈ M, let
denote the marginal distributions of the mixed actions and forecasts, respectively. Also, let (q, y) denote a random vector distributed according to µ.
Lemma 5.
1.
We have that µ ∈ M if and only if E (q|y) = y, µ 2 -a.s.
2.
For any µ ∈ M and any convex function V on R |Z| , we have that
Proof. To prove part 1 we use the following standard definition of the conditional expectation (see, e.g., Shiryaev [38] , p. 220). The conditional expectation of the random variable q under the condition that y = y is any Borel-measurable function
However, by the calibration property,
Therefore, E(y) = y satisfies (6) , and the result follows by substituting y with the random variable y. Now, part 2 of the lemma easily follows by part 1 and Jensen's inequality. Indeed, for any convex function V on R |Z| , it holds that
We illustrate the relation between the two distributions µ 1 and µ 2 using the following example. Example 9. Suppose that the empirical distribution of the opponent's mixed actions converges to
That is, in the long term, the opponent chooses α percent of the time the mixed action q (1) whileᾱ percent of the time he chooses the mixed action q (2) . It is easy to see that in this case, the following two forecasters are calibrated: (i) with y k − q k → 0, and (ii) with y k → αq (1) +ᾱq (2) q 0 . Indeed, the joint empirical distribution in the first case converges to µ = αδ q (1) ,q (1) +ᾱδ q (2) ,q (2) while in the second case to µ = αδ q (1) ,q 0 +ᾱδ q (2) ,q 0 .
It can be easily verified that, in both cases, µ ∈ M. Also, in the first case, obviously
since both marginal distributions are the same. However, in the second case
where the inequality follows by convexity of V . Namely, there is less variability in µ 2 than in µ 1 .
The Calibrated Approachability Algorithm
Recall that p * denotes a regular response function relative to the given target set S (Definition 6). The algorithm that we analyze in the remainder of the paper is conceptually simple -at each time n use the mixed action p n which is specified by p n = p * (y n ),
where y n is the calibrated forecast at time n. This algorithm was previously proposed by Perchet [34] .
Approachability Results
We show that the proposed algorithm is an approachability algorithm for conv(S) in general, and establish its opportunistic properties in case of a statistically restricted play of the opponent. (The case of an empirically restricted opponent is analyzed in Section 5.)
In Theorem 4 below, we prove an abstract and general property of the Calibrated Approachability Algorithm that relates the empirical distribution of the mixed actions of the opponent to the empirical distribution of the forecasts and the corresponding average reward. This result implies the general approachability result to conv(S), as well as the opportunistic property of the algorithm (see Corollary 2) .
Recall the definitions of the set M in (4) and the corresponding marginal distributions µ 1 (·) and µ 2 (·) in (5). Also, let
denote the empirical distribution of the mixed actions {q k } n k=1 . For a given f n , we can define the following set of possible reward vectors:
This is the set of all expected target rewards, where the expected value is with respect to a marginal distribution of the forecasts which is "compatible" with the calibration property (i.e., belongs to the set M in (4)) and with the empirical distribution f n of {q k } n k=1 . We note that R n is a convex set by definition of M. Still, in order to take into account the possible jumps in r * (y) on the boundary of M, we need to augment R n as follows (see also Definition 8):
Observe that under Assumption 2, R + n ⊆ conv(S). We note that R + n can be interpreted as the closed convex image of a set M under the function E Y ∼µ 2 [r * (Y )], constrained that the marginal distribution of the opponent's actions equal to f n . Also, observe that when r * is continuous, we have that R + n = R n . Theorem 4. Suppose that Assumption 2 holds. Then, if the agent uses the Calibrated Approachability Algorithm specified by (7), we have that
almost surely, for any strategy of the opponent.
We defer the proofs to Section 4.4. The following example clarifies the essence of the result of Theorem 4.
Example 10 (Example 9 continued). Recall the setting of Example 9, where two possible calibrated forecasts were considered: (i) with y k − q k → 0, and (ii) with y k → αq (1) +ᾱq (2) q 0 . Observe that in the first case, Theorem 4 implies thatr n converges to R + ({q (1) , q (2) }). In particular, if r * (q) is continuous at q (1) and q (2) ,r n converges to conv({r * (q (1) ), r * (q (2) )}). In the second case, Theorem 4 implies thatr n converges to R + ({q 0 }). In particular, if r * (q) is continuous at q 0 ,r n converges to r * (q 0 ) ∈ S. In the special case, where the opponent chooses at each time instant the mixed action q (1) with probability α and q (2) with probabilityᾱ, it is easy to see that only the calibrated forecast of case (ii) above is possible, and hence Theorem 4 implies thatr n converges to R + ({q 0 }).
The following corollary establishes the opportunistic approachability property of the Calibrated Approachability Algorithm illustrated by Example 10. That is, the strategy specified by the Calibrated Approachability Algorithm is statistically opportunistic in the sense of Definition 9. Specifically, if Q = {q 0 }, where q 0 is a continuity point of the (piecewise continuous) response map p * (q), we have that lim n→∞rn = r * (q 0 ) ∈ S.
Proofs
Proof of Theorem 4. We prove below that, for a general opponent,
But, by the definition of R + n in (8),
and the result of the theorem follows. Fix ǫ > 0. By compactness of ∆(A), there exists a partition of ∆(A) into a finite number l of measurable sets P 1 , P 2 , ..., P l , with the property that if p, p
. By our definition of p * (Definition 6), {Q i } are measurable sets which represent a partition of ∆(Z) (although not necessarily an ǫ-partition), and since p k = p * (y k ) we have I {p k ∈ P i } = I {y k ∈ Q i }. Finally, for every i, we fix a representative element p i ∈ P i (e.g., central point of P i ). We have that
In this sequence, the first inequality holds since when y k ∈ Q i , we have p k ∈ P i and
where ρ is the span of the reward function (1). In the second equality, we use r(p i , ·) to denote the reward matrix that corresponds to a mixed strategy p i , so that r(p i , ·)y k = r(p i , y k ). The third equality follows by the calibration property (Definition 11). Finally, the second inequality above holds again by (11) . Since this inequality holds for any ǫ > 0, the result follows.
To prove Corollary 2, we need the following important result.
Lemma 6. For any strategy of the opponent, the following implication holds true almost surely: if the sequence of the opponent's mixed actions is statistically Q-restricted as per Definition 4, then the sequence of calibrated forecasts {y k } ∞ k=1 is also statistically Q-restricted. Proof. Recall that by Lemma 4, the joint empirical distribution µ n "converges" to the set M defined in (4) . In addition, the Cesaro-convergence of q k is equivalent to convergence of the marginal empirical distribution f n of {q k } n k=1 to the set
Using Lemma 5 with V (·) being the (convex) Euclidean point-to-set distance d(·, Q), we also have that the marginal empirical distribution g n of {y k } n k=1 satisfies
Proof of Corollary 2. The result follows by Lemma 6 since for n → ∞, the support of the empirical distribution of the forecasts, g n µ n,2 , is restricted to Q. Therefore
by the definition of R + (Q). In particular, consider the case Q = {q 0 }, where q 0 is a continuity point of the (piecewise continuous) response map p * (q). Then, q 0 is also a continuity point of r * (q), and R + (Q) = {r(p * (q 0 ), q 0 )} = {r * (q 0 )} is a singleton by its definition.
Additional Remarks
The rate of convergence of (9) is that of the calibrated forecast used. E.g., for ǫ-calibration (and thus, ǫ-approachability) using internal regret minimization, the rate is the standard rate of convergence of no-regret algorithms, that is of O(1/ √ n) [9] . Our algorithm assumes that an exact calibration algorithms is used. If, instead, an ǫ-calibration forecaster is employed, our results carry over with minor modifications as follows. First, the set M should be replaced with
Also, it is easy to see that the convergence results of Theorem 4 and Corollary 2 hold with lim n→∞ (·) = 0 replaced by lim sup n→∞ (·) ≤ ǫ. Finally, instead of using the exact closed convex image of a set, R + (Q), one should use
This is required since in the case of ǫ-calibration, Cesaro-convergence condition of Corollary 2 only implies that lim sup
Approachability Using Slowly Varying Calibration
In Section 4, we analyzed the behaviour of a basic calibrated approachability algorithm and proved its opportunistic properties against a statistically restricted play of the opponent. In this section, we turn to the analysis of our algorithm in the case when the opponent's play is empirically restricted. In particular, we pose the following question: does the fact that the empirical frequencies of the pure (observed) actions are restricted to a set Q in the sense of Definition 5 implies that the Calibrated Approachability Algorithm (7) converges to R + (Q) (similarly to the result of Corollary 2 for the case of statistically Q-restricted opponent)? The following example shows that this is not necessarily the case.
Example 11 (Example 6 continued). Recall the setting of Example 6, where the goal is to approach the non-convex set S = (−∞, −1] ∪ [1, ∞). Suppose that the opponent's actions are 0, 0, 1, 0, 0, 1, ..., implying thatq n → q 0 = 2/3. An opportunistic approachability algorithm should ideally converge in this case to R + ({q 0 }) (see Definition 10) . Indeed, the fixed forecaster y n = 2/3 is calibrated, and the Calibrated Approachability Algorithm that uses this forecaster will approach
where the first equality follows since q 0 is a continuity point of the response function p * defined in (2) . Now since 4/3 ∈ S, the algorithm will approach S. However, consider a perfect forecaster that predicts y n = 1(z n ). If the Calibrated Approachability Algorithm uses this forecaster, it approaches 2 3 r * ((1, 0) ) + 1 3 r * ((0, 1)) = 2 3 r((1, 0), (1, 0)) + 1 3 r((0, 1), (0, 1)) = 2/3, which is not in S. Hence, in this case, only convergence to conv(S) is guaranteed. This example illustrates the fact that a perfect forecaster is bad for the purpose of empirically opportunistic approachability. In fact, we would prefer a fixed forecaster, or more generally, a slowly time-varying forecaster. This motivates us to introduce the following assumption in terms of the probability distributions of the forecasts {η n }. To this end, for any probability measures
denote the total variation distance, where the suprimum is taken over Borel-measurable sets A ⊆ ∆(Z).
Assumption 3 (Slowly Varying Calibration Algorithm). The probability distribution η n is changing slowly. Namely, there exists n 0 < ∞ such that for all n ≥ n 0 ,
for some ξ > 0 and C < ∞.
We note that Assumption 3 is not probabilistic since it is stated in terms of the randomizing probabilities of the calibrated forecaster (and not in terms of the actual forecasts, which are random). In Section 5.2, we will show that there exists a specific calibration algorithm that satisfies this property (see Corollary 3) . We leave open the interesting question of whether some slow variation property, in the spirit of the above, is intrinsically related to the calibration requirement, or is a property of the specific algorithm used.
Approachability Result
The following theorem shows that if the Calibrated Approachability Algorithm uses a slowly varying calibrated forecaster, it is empirically opportunistic 2 in the sense of Definition 10.
Theorem 5. Suppose that Assumption 2 holds, and a calibration algorithm satisfies Assumption 3 with a parameter ξ > 0. For any strategy of the opponent, the following implication then holds true almost surely: if the play of the opponent is empirically Q-restricted (as per Definition 5) with respect to a partition {τ m } with either
(1) Bounded blocks lengths τ m ≤τ < ∞, or (2) Growing blocks lengths τ m = O(m ν ) with ν > 0, under the condition that ξ > ν/(ν + 1), then, lim
Below is an outline of the proof. We first claim in Lemma 7 that the calibration property (3) can be stated in terms of the distributions of the forecasts η n (rather than the forecasts y n themselves). We then prove in Lemma 8 that Assumption 3 actually implies a calibration property in terms of the empirical frequencies of the actions (rather than pure or mixed actions themselves). Finally, we show that this last property implies opportunistic approachability in terms of the empirical frequencies.
Lemma 7. The calibration property (3) is equivalent to the following lifted calibration property in terms of the forecast distributions η n :
The proof of Lemma 7 is based on standard analysis of a suitably defined martingale difference sequence. See Appendix B for details.
Recall that n M M m=1 τ m , andq m denotes the empirical distribution of the opponent's actions at block m. Also, letη m = η km , be any sequence of forecast distributions with the corresponding (deterministic) index subsequence n m−1 + 1 ≤ k m ≤ n m . We show below that Assumption 3 implies the following calibration property in terms of the empirical distributions {q m }.
Definition 12 (Calibration for Empirical Frequencies). A calibrated forecaster is said to be calibrated for empirical frequencies on a given partition {τ m }, if the forecast distributions can be fixed during each block, without violating the (lifted) calibration property (12) . That is,
for all {η m } withη m = η km and n m−1 + 1 ≤ k m ≤ n m , and all Borel-measurable Q ⊆ ∆(Z).
The following lemma shows that a calibration algorithm is calibrated for empirical frequencies if it is slowly varying. Lemma 8. Suppose that a calibration algorithm satisfies Assumption 3 with a parameter ξ > 0. Then, it is calibrated for empirical frequencies (as per Definition 12) for any partition with either (1) Bounded blocks lengths τ m ≤τ < ∞, or (2) Growing blocks lengths τ m = O(m ν ) with ν > 0, under the condition that ξ > ν/(ν + 1).
The proof of Lemma 8 is based on fixing the forecast distribution during each block and employing the slow varying calibration property to bound the difference of the corresponding expected values. The detailed proof can be found in Appendix B. Finally, we prove Theorem 5.
Proof of Theorem 5. Letμ M be the empirical joint distribution of {q m } and {η m } using the partition {τ m }, that isμ
(I.e.,μ M is a distribution over pairs (q, η), where q is a probability vector in ∆(Z) and η is a distribution over probability vectors in ∆(Z).) Note that Lemma 8 implies thatμ M "converges" to
for any choice of {η m }, in the sense that
Now, since the opponent's play satisfies Definition 5, it holds that
Also, it can be easily verified that an analogue of Lemma 5 holds for the set M. In particular, we have that µ ∈ M if and only if E (q|y) = y, µ-a.s.
where (q, y) denote a pair of random variables distributed according to µ. Indeed, by the definition of the conditional expectation E(q|y = y), we have that
Now, µ ∈ M if and only if
implying that (15) holds. Consequently, for any convex function V , it holds that
We use this last result to prove the restriction property of {y n } as in the proof of Lemma 6. In particular, using V (q) = d(q, Q) and (14), we have that
by the strong law of large numbers applied to the Martingale difference sequence
, and the result of the Theorem follows similarly to the proof of Corollary 4. Remark 5. Observe that if the forecast distribution is fixed during each block, then Definition 12 is equivalent to the definition of calibration (see (12) ). In general, this is of course not true. Lemma 8 shows that Definition 12 is satisfied for slowly varying calibrated forecasters. In fact, it is sufficient that the requirement (13) of Definition 12 holds for a given sample path of the opponent's play in order to obtain the result of Theorem 5.
The Existence of Slowly Varying Calibration Algorithms
In this section, we show that there exists a calibration algorithm that satisfies Assumption 3. The algorithm that we analyze is based on a specific method for internal regret minimization. We present a general connection between calibration and internal no-regret in Section 5.2.2. But first, we prove a result of independent interest that establishes a slowly varying property of a specific internal no-regret algorithm.
Slowly Varying Internal Regret Minimization
Consider, as before, a repeated two-person game between an agent and an arbitrary opponent. At time instant n, the agent chooses its action I n from a finite set {1, 2, ..., N } randomly according to a probability distribution η n ∈ ∆({1, 2, ..., N }), while the opponent chooses its action z n ∈ Z. The average expected loss incurred by the agent up to time n isl
where ℓ(i, z) is a given one-stage loss function, and ℓ(η, z) is its expected value with respect to η.
That is, this is a probability distribution which transfers the weight of i to j. We say that the agent minimizes internal no-regret with respect to the loss function ℓ if lim sup
for any strategy of the opponent. See [9] for an overview of internal no-regret algorithms. Below, we analyze a specific internal no-regret algorithm from [9] that uses exponentially weighted average strategy to define η n . In particular, let
with α n = 1/ √ n. Also, define the stochastic matrix P n with the following elements:
Note that (P n ) i,j can be interpreted as a transition probability from i to j in the sense of transferring the weight from i to j in the previously used strategies η k , k = 1, ..., n − 1. The internal regret minimizing strategy at time n, η n , is then defined as a solution of the fixed point equation
Therefore, η n is a stationary distribution of the Markov chain that corresponds to P n . Note that this solution is unique.
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Proof. Note that the state space is finite, and for all n
Therefore, (P n ) i,j > 0 for all i, j, and in particular (P n ) i,i > 0. Hence the chains are irreducible and aperiodic.
The next theorem establishes that the distributions of the agent's actions change slowly with time.
Theorem 6. The distributions η n satisfy Assumption 3 for all n ≥ 3.
Proof Outline. This theorem follows by the smoothness property of the transition matrices P n , which in turn implies smoothness of the corresponding stationary distributions η n . The detailed proof is rather involved and can be found in Appendix C.
Calibration and Internal
No-Regret Next, we outline a general connection between calibration and internal no-regret. For simplicity, we focus on the binary case Z = {0, 1} and ǫ-calibration algorithms. The results for exact calibrated forecasters and for general action set Z follow by the arguments similar to those in [9] .
For brevity, we let y n ∈ [0, 1] denote the forecast of z n = 1. As was mentioned, the construction of the calibration algorithm starts from discretization of [0, 1] into N intervals. For a fixed N , an ǫ-calibration algorithm is then constructed, where ǫ → 0 as N → ∞. A calibrated forecast can then be obtained by using a simple application of the doubling trick, letting N → ∞.
We present the connection between any ǫ-calibration algorithm and internal regret minimization of the squared loss function. Assume that the ǫ-calibrated forecaster is given by
where I n ∈ {0, 1, ..., N } is randomly selected according to a probability distribution η n ∈ ∆ ({0, 1, ..., N }) .
The following result was shown in [9] , using the so-called Brier score.
Lemma 10.
A forecaster is ǫ-calibrated if and only if it minimizes the internal regret with respect to the loss function
Hence, we have the following corollary that establishes the existence of slowly varying calibrated forecasters.
Corollary 3. The calibrated forecaster that is based on internal regret minimization technique presented in Section 5.2.1 satisfies Assumption 3 for all n ≥ 3.
Proof. The result follows by Theorem 6 and Lemma 10.
Constrained Regret Minimization
We next apply our opportunistic approachability framework to the problem of regret minimization subject to average cost constraints [30] .
Consider first the standard (unconstrained) regret minimization problem, where as before, the agent faces an arbitrarily varying environment (the opponent). The repeated game model is the same as above, except that the vector reward function r is replaced by a scalar reward (or utility) function u : A × Z → R. Letū n n −1 n k=1 u k denote the average reward by time n. The goal of the agent is to maximizeū n . Suppose that the agent knew in advance that the empirical distribution q n of the opponent's actions is sayq n = q. He could then maximize its average reward by repeatedly choosing the action that solved
However, in the online setting, when the actions of the opponent can be arbitrary and are not known in advance, a suitable goal introduced in Hannan [15] is to minimize the regret, namely to ensure that lim sup
almost surely, for every strategy of the opponent. Right after Hannan's seminal paper, Blackwell [6] used approachability theory in order to elegantly show the existence of regret minimizing algorithms. Define the vector-valued rewards r n (u n , 1(z n )) ∈ R × ∆(Z). The corresponding average reward is thenr n n −1 n k=1 r k = (ū n ,q n ). Finally, define the target set
It can be easily verified that this set is a D-set, and it is convex by the convexity of u * (q). Hence, S is approachable, and by the continuity of u * (q), an algorithm that approaches S also minimizes the regret in the sense of (23) .
In the constrained regret minimization problem, in addition to the scalar reward function u, we are given a vector-valued cost function c : A × Z → R s . We are also given a closed and convex set Γ ⊆ R s , the constraint set, defining the allowed values for the long-term average cost (see below). The typical case is that of linear constraints, that is Γ = {c ∈ R s : c i ≤ γ i , i = 1, ..., s} for some vector γ ∈ R s . The constraint set is assumed to be feasible, in the sense that for every q ∈ ∆(Z), there exists p ∈ ∆(A), such that c(p, q) ∈ Γ.
Letc n n −1 n k=1 c k denote the average cost by time n. The agent is required to satisfy the cost constraints, in the sense that lim n→∞ d(c n , Γ) = 0 must hold, irrespectively of the opponent's play. Subject to these constraints, the agent wishes to maximize his average rewardū n .
Suppose the agent knew in advance that the empirical distributionq n equals to q. He could then maximize its expected average reward subject to the constraints by always choosing the mixed action p that solved the following program:
We consider u * Γ (q) as the best-reward-in-hindsight for the constrained problem. The goal of the agent would be then to attain u * Γ in the following sense. Definition 13 (Constrained no-regret). A strategy of the agent π is a constrained no-regret strategy with respect to a function u The problem of attaining u * Γ (·) can be formulated as an approachability problem, which extends Blackwell's original formulation for the unconstrained case presented above. Define the vectorvalued rewards r n (u n , c n , 1(z n )) ∈ R s+1 × ∆(Z). The corresponding average reward becomes r n n −1 n k=1 r k = (ū n ,c n ,q n ) . Finally, define the target set
It is easily verified that an algorithm that approaches S also attains u * Γ (q) if u * Γ (q) is continuous. Furthermore, the set S is a D-set by construction (see below). However, the function u * Γ (q) is not convex in general, which implies that the set S is not convex. Therefore, one cannot invoke the dual condition to infer approachability of S, but only of its convex hull. Indeed, it was shown in Mannor et al. [30] that S is not approachable in general.
A feasible (approachable) target set is then the convex hull of S. This may be written as
where the function conv (u * Γ ) is the lower convex hull of u * Γ (·) (i.e., the largest convex function over ∆(Z) that is smaller than u * Γ ). Now, since conv(S) is approachable, it follows that conv(u * Γ )(q) is attainable, in the sense of Definition 13.
Two algorithms were proposed in Mannor et al. [30] for attaining the relaxed goal function conv(u * Γ ). The first is a standard approachability algorithm for conv(S), which requires the demanding calculation of projection directions to the convex hull of S. Further, this algorithm is not opportunistic, in the sense described below. The second algorithm relies on computing calibrated forecasts of the opponent's actions, and as we show below is actually equivalent to our calibrationbased approachability algorithm when used for this special case. Our opportunistic convergence results thus apply to this algorithm.
In order to apply our algorithm, a regular response function p * (Definition 6) is required. It is easily seen that any choice of
yields a response function, in the sense that r(p * (q), q) ∈ S. A regular (piecewise continuous) selection can be induced, for example, by imposing a lexicographic precedence over the coordinates of p in case the maximizing set is not a singleton. The goal function in this case is then
Thus, our Calibrated Approachability Algorithm can be applied, and the results of Sections 4 and 5 imply that the algorithm approaches conv(S), hence attains the relaxed goal function conv(u * Γ ). In particular, Corollary 2 and Theorem 5 show that S itself is approached whenever the opponent is either statistically or empirically restricted to a singleton Q = {q 0 } that is a continuity point of p * (q). Interestingly, in the present case the last continuity requirement can be removed.
Lemma 11. For the model of the present section, R + ({q}) ⊆ S (rather than conv(S)) for every q ∈ ∆(Z).
Proof. Observe that the first component of r * (defined in (27) ) is continuous in q (see Mannor et al. 30) . Also, note that the jumps of c(p * (q), q), the second component of r * , lie entirely in S. This is true since, for the fixed first component, the induced set is convex due to convexity of Γ. Consequently, the jumps of r * (q) around a given q ∈ ∆(Z) lie in S, which implies that R + ({q}) ⊆ S by its definition. This brings us back to our requirement for a constrained no-regret algorithm, in Definition 13. While this requirement cannot be attained for any strategy of the opponent, we have just seen that it is attained whenever the opponent is asymptotically stationary, in the sense that its actions are (statistically or empirically) converging to a singleton. In that case, the algorithm attains u * Γ (q), the best-reward-in-hindsight, rather than a relaxed goal, while satisfying the average cost constraints.
Example (Classification with specificity constraints) In Bernstein et al. [3] , we considered the online problem of merging the output of multiple binary classifiers, with the goal of maximizing the true-positive rate, while keeping the false-positive rate under a given threshold 0 < γ < 1. As shown there, this problem may be formulated as a constrained regret minimization problem, and provides a concrete learning application for the theory developed here.
Conclusion and Future Work
In this paper, our central goal was to formulate the concept of opportunistic approachability. We have also devised a class of calibration-based approachability algorithms and shown that they are opportunistic in the sense advocated here. The presented algorithms are computationally challenging in that they require the computation of calibrated forecasts. In addition, a procedure for the computation of the response function p * is required, the complexity of which is problem dependent. However, given these two components, the computational burden is much lighter than standard approachability that requires computing the projection to the target set and solving a zero-sum game in every stage. Specifically, it is sometimes difficult to compute the projection to the convex hull of a non-convex set; a step which our approach avoids.
We have applied our opportunistic approachability framework to the problem of regret minimization subject to average cost constraints, and shown that the best-reward-in-hindsight (rather than its convex relaxation) is attained when the opponent turns out to be stationary in our sense.
Below we present some topics of future interest. Our calibration-based algorithm is conceptually simple and of general applicability. However, while considerable progress has been made recently towards the efficient computation of calibrated forecasts [29, 36, 1] , this remains a demanding task. Therefore, it should be of interest to devise alternative algorithms that are computationally efficient and have optimal convergence rates. Initial results on a new class of opportunistic approachability algorithms that is based on online convex optimization methods appear in Bernstein et al. [4] . In addition, the work in Bernstein and Shimkin [5] focuses on designing simple and efficient algorithms that are based on the concept of a response function (rather than projection), which are however not opportunistic in the sense advocated in this paper.
We note that there are several other regret minimization problems where our framework can be applied, such as online learning with global cost functions [11] , regret minimization in variable duration repeated games [28] , and regret minimization in stochastic game models [27] . In particular, as in the problem of constrained regret minimization, the best-reward-in-hindsight is not attainable in these models in general, but only its convex relaxation. Our approach only requires that we can compute the response function, and this can be done efficiently in these cases. Of course some technical adaptation is needed to account for the models' dynamics in the two latter cases, which is a subject of future work. 
Now, the first term above converges to zero by (12) . We prove that the other two terms also converge to zero under Assumption 3. Let us assume, without loss of generality, that n 0 of AssumptionSince the measures η n are discrete, we identify them with the corresponding probability vectors, and provide bounds for the ℓ ∞ distance η n − η n−1 ∞ . The total variation distance can be then bounded by η n − η n−1 T V ≤ N η n − η n−1 ∞ .
For the first step, we follow [31] and introduce the following definitions. Definition 14 (Group Inverse). Let A be a given squared matrix with rank(A 2 ) = rank(A). The group inverse of A is the unique matrix A # such that A Using these definitions, the bound on the variation of η n can be expressed as follows. Proposition 1. We have that, η n − η n−1 ∞ ≤ κ P n − P n−1 ∞ for all n.
Proof. Given the result of Lemma 9, this Proposition follows by applying the results for two perturbed Markov chains, presented e.g. in [31] , to a sequence of Markov chains.
As a second step, we provide a bound on P n − P n−1 ∞ , where P n is given in (20) . The potential difficulty in providing such bound is the fact that the denominator in the exponentially weighted forecaster (19) can in principle go to zero as n goes to infinity. To overcome this difficulty, we introduce a modified definition of this forecaster. Let {β n } be a given sequence, and set φ (i,j),n exp α n n−1 k=1
It is easy to see that the exponentially weighted forecaster (19) is equivalent to
We first argue that we can construct the sequence {β n } so that the max i =j φ (i,j),n is bounded from below and above in the limit. Indeed, consider the following history-dependent sequence: (i) Starting from time n = 0, set β n = 0 as long as ∃i = j :
(ii) If at time instance n 0 the above condition fails to hold true, set (iii) Suppose that the above condition is first satisfied at time instance n 1 . Then, set β n = 0 for n ≥ n 1 as long as ∃i = j : 
for any sample path of the play. With this at hand, we prove the following lemma.
